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THE USER PRINCIPLE 
Rashomon Effect or Much Ado about Nothing? 
The underlying basis of an award of damages according to 
the user principle is the subject of intense and heated debate. 
The main debate concerns whether such awards are 
compensatory or restitutionary. Whilst more complex theories 
exist including mixed compensatory/restitutionary accounts, 
it is proposed that at the heart of the debate lies a dispute over 
the law’s conception of gain and loss. Should gains and losses 
be narrowly or broadly conceived? It is suggested that the 
cases are only consistent with a broad conception of both 
since some cases would be inexplicable on a narrow 
conception of the same. If this is correct, then the 
restitutionary analysis, whilst theoretically plausible, would 
be practically unappealing to plaintiffs since on this basis, 
claims would be subject to defences not available to the same 
claim analysed purely in compensatory terms. Accordingly, it 
is difficult to imagine that a plaintiff would ever plead its case 
purely in restitutionary terms. 
Kelvin F K LOW* 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford);  
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);  
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 In Stoke-on-Trent Council v W & J Wass Ltd1 (“Stoke-on-Trent 
Council”), Nicholls LJ opens his judgment as follows:2 
It is an established principle concerning the assessment of damages 
that a person who has wrongfully used another’s property without 
causing the latter any pecuniary loss may still be liable to that other for 
more than nominal damages. In general, he is liable to pay, as 
damages, a reasonable sum for the wrongful use he has made of the 
other’s property. 
                                                          
* The author would like to thank the editor for this volume, Prof Elise Bant, for her 
very helpful comments on an earlier draft. The usual caveat applies. 
1 [1988] 1 WLR 1406. 
2 Stoke-on-Trent Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 at 1416. 
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Christened the “user principle” by his Lordship in the same case,3 its 
underlying basis has been and remains the subject of intense debate. Are 
damages awarded on the basis of the user principle awarded on a 
compensatory basis or a restitutionary basis? It will be seen that courts’ 
and commentators’ views of whether such awards are compensatory or 
restitutionary turn on their perspectives of what the words “loss” and 
“gain” mean in the law. It may thus be an instance of the occurrence of 
what has been termed the Rashomon effect in the law relating to 
remedies. Named after the classic 1950 Japanese film Rashomon by the 
acclaimed director Akira Kurosawa,4 the Rashomon effect is understood 
to represent contradictory interpretations of the same event by different 
people. On some accounts, the basis of an award of damages on the basis 
of the user principle has a practical significance.5 However, on a 
different view, it is a matter of no practical consequence.6 If the 
underlying basis of the award carries with it no practical import, then 
the entire exercise of trying to resolve this apparently intractable debate 
may perhaps be better laughed off as much ado about nothing. This 
article suggests that the better view is that, where such awards are 
available, whilst practical differences follow depending on which basis, 
compensatory or restitutionary, is preferred, both approaches are 
equally plausible. Despite their comparable credibility, the advantages of 
a compensatory analysis will invariably be preferred by plaintiffs who 
are normally permitted to bring such claims as they please. Thus, as a 
matter of litigation strategy, the theoretical differences fade into 
insignificance as lawyers would be well advised to argue both but lead 
with compensation. Nevertheless, a proper understanding of their 
underlying basis is, despite its apparent practical insignificance in its 
particular context, of immense value to the law of remedies more 
generally. 
II. A brief history of the user principle 
2 Damages awarded under the user principle come in numerous 
guises. The best established of such awards concern awards of 
                                                          
3 Stoke-on-Trent Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 at 1416. 
4 The film explores the death of a samurai near Kyoto’s Rashomon Gate and is 
famous for its then novel plot device. The film tells the story of the samurai’s death 
through the perspective of four different characters (the samurai’s wife, a bandit, 
a woodcutter and the dead samurai speaking through a medium) who give wildly 
different accounts of the same event. 
5 See, eg, Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 regarding 
the availability of the defence of change of position. 
6 See, eg, ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [41], 
per Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA, describing the difficulties as “principally 
juridical” [emphasis in original]. 
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“wayleave” arising out of trespass to land.7 In Whitwham v Westminster 
Brymbo Coal and Coke Co8 (“Whitwham”), Lindley LJ remarked that the 
wayleave cases are “based upon the principle that, if one person has 
without the leave of another been using that other’s land for his own 
purposes, he ought to pay for such user”.9 In that case, the defendant had 
caused damage to the plaintiff ’s land by tipping refuse from their 
colliery upon it. They sought to limit their liability to the diminution in 
value of the plaintiff ’s land rather than the larger wayleave award. In 
rejecting the appeal, Lindley LJ remarked:10 
[O]n what principle of justice can it be said that these defendants are 
to use the plaintiffs’ land for years for their own purposes, and to pay 
nothing for it, in addition to the injury that they have done to the 
land? 
Where the use of land is more extensive and amounts to an occupation 
rather than a mere temporary user, the same principle is reflected by an 
award but goes by a different name. Such awards, sometimes referred to 
as mesne profits, were available regardless of whether the land could or 
would have been let to another during the period of occupation.11 The 
same principle applies in respect of chattels. 
3 In Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford 
Entertainments Ltd12 (“Strand Electric”), after referring to awards of 
wayleave, Denning LJ remarked: “I see no reason why the same 
principle should not apply to detention of goods.”13 Somervell LJ in the 
same case drew the analogy with claims for mesne profits rather than 
wayleave but reached the same conclusion as to the availability of 
awards assessed in accordance with what has come to be known as the 
user principle.14 
4 In Stoke-on-Trent Council, Nicholls LJ observed that the same 
principle has also been applied in relation to intangible property, in 
                                                          
7 Martin v Porter (1839) 5 M & W 351; (1839) 151 ER 149; Powell v Aiken (1858) 
4 K & J 343; (1858) 70 ER 144; Hilton v Woods (1867) LR 4 Eq 432; Jegon v Vivian 
(1871) LR 6 Ch App 742; Phillips v Homfray (1883) 24 Ch D 439; Bocardo SA v Star 
Energy UK Onshore Ltd [2010] UKSC 35; [2011] 1 AC 380. 
8 [1896] 2 Ch 538. 
9 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 541–542. 
10 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 542. 
11 Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285 at 288; Dean and Chapter of 
the Cathedral of Christ Cantebury v Whitbread plc [1995] 1 EGLR 82 at 85. 
12 [1952] 2 QB 246. 
13 Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 
2 QB 246 at 254. 
14 Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 
2 QB 246 at 252. 
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particular patents.15 As rationalised by Lord Shaw in Watson, Laidlaw & 
Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and Williamson16 (“Watson”):17 
[T]here remains that class of business which the respondents would 
not have done; and in such cases it appears to me that the correct and 
full measure is only reached by adding that a patentee is also entitled, 
on the principle of price or hire, to a royalty for the unauthorised sale 
or use of every one of the infringing machines in a market which the 
[patentee], if left to himself, might not have reached. Otherwise, that 
property which consists in the monopoly of the patented articles 
granted to the patentee has been invaded, and indeed abstracted, and 
the law, when appealed to, would be standing by and allowing the 
invader or abstractor to go free. In such cases a royalty is an excellent 
key to unlock the difficulty, and I am in entire accord with the 
principle laid down by Lord Moulton in Meters Ld v Metropolitan Gas 
Meters Ld (28 RPC 163). Each of the infringements was an actionable 
wrong, and although it may have been committed in a range of 
business or of territory which the patentee might not have reached, he 
is entitled to hire or royalty in respect of each unauthorised use of his 
property. Otherwise, the remedy might fall unjustly short of the 
wrong. 
5 While more established in respect of patent infringements, in 
Blayney t/a Aardvark Jewelry v Clogau St David’s Gold Mines Ltd,18 
Sir Andrew Morritt V-C extended the same principle to instances of 
copyright infringement thus:19 
Given that that is the rule in the case of infringements of patents I can 
see no reason not to apply it in cases of infringements of copyright. In 
each case the infringement is an interference with the property rights 
of the owner … Though the nature of the monopoly conferred by a 
patent is not the same as that conferred by copyright I see no reason 
why that should affect the recoverability of damages in cases where the 
monopoly right has been infringed. The fact that the plaintiff may not 
be able to prove the application of one measure of damages, namely 
lost sales, does not mean that he has suffered no damage at all, rather 
some other measure by which to assess the compensation for that 
interference must be sought. Whilst, no doubt, there are differences 
between the rights granted to a patentee and those enjoyed by the 
owner of the copyright they draw no distinction between the effect of 
an infringement of a patent rather than a copyright. 
                                                          
15 Stoke-on-Trent Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 at 1416–1418. 
16 (1914) 31 RPC 104. 
17 Watson, Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 
at 120. 
18 [2002] EWCA Civ 1007; [2003] FSR 360. 
19 Blayney t/a Aardvark Jewelry v Clogau St David’s Gold Mines Ltd [2002] EWCA 
Civ 1007; [2003] FSR 360 at [20]. 
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It has also been applied in the context of trade mark infringement in 
32Red plc v WHG (International) Ltd,20 but here its applicability is far 
from uncontroversial. In 32Red plc v WHG (International) Ltd, the 
parties agreed that the user principle was the correct basis for 
assessment. However, in Reed Executive v Reed Business Information,21 
Jacob LJ was “by no means convinced that the ‘user’ principle 
automatically applies in trade marks and passing off cases, especially 
where the mark concerned is not the sort of ‘mark’ available for hire” 
[emphasis in original].22 
III. Related awards: Wrotham Park damages 
6 Damages awarded under the Chancery Amendment Act 185823 
(“Lord Cairns’ Act”),24 in lieu of specific performance or an injunction, 
are also regarded as being premised “[o]n an analogous principle”.25 
This can be clearly seen in the landmark case of Wrotham Park Estate 
Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd26 (“Wrotham Park”). In that case, the 
first defendant developed its land in breach of a restrictive covenant. 
The plaintiffs brought an action shortly after the building works 
began but failed to seek an interlocutory injunction to restrain the 
development so that the works were complete by the date of the trial. 
Brightman J declined to grant the plaintiffs’ prayer for a mandatory 
injunction for the demolition of the buildings as he considered that it 
would “be an unpardonable waste of much needed houses to direct that 
they now be pulled down”.27 Nevertheless, his Lordship was leery of 
awarding the plaintiffs merely nominal damages simply because the 
value of its own land had not been diminished by one farthing as a 
consequence of the breach:28 
If, for social and economic reasons, the court does not see fit in the 
exercise of its discretion, to order demolition of the 14 houses, is it just 
that the plaintiffs should receive no compensation and that the 
defendants should be left in undisturbed possession of the fruits of 
their wrongdoing? Common sense would seem to demand a negative 
answer to this question. 
                                                          
20 [2013] EWHC 815. 
21 [2004] RPC 40. 
22 Reed Executive v Reed Business Information [2004] RPC 40 at [165]. 
23 c 27. 
24 Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (c 27) s 2. 
25 Stoke-on-Trent Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 at 1413, per Nourse LJ. 
26 [1974] 1 WLR 798. 
27 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 at 811. 
28 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 at 812. 
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In buttressing his instinct as a matter of common sense, his Lordship 
drew support29 from cases awarding wayleave rent,30 patent infringement31 
and detinue32 in accordance with the user principle mentioned above. 
His Lordship eventually concluded that:33 
… a just substitute for a mandatory injunction would be such a sum of 
money as might reasonably have been demanded by the plaintiffs 
from [the first defendants] as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant. 
Subsequent cases have established that the measure of damages so 
assessed is not to be regarded as peculiar and different from an 
assessment of the same at common law.34 In the words of Chadwick LJ 
in World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Inc,35 “[t]he 
power to award damages on a Wrotham Park basis does not depend on 
Lord Cairns’s Act: it exists at common law”.36 
IV. Remedial objectives of the user principle: There and back 
again? 
7 The early cases awarding substantial damages on the basis of the 
user principle (or analogous principles) do not appear to have analysed 
the question of its remedial objective with too much sophistication, 
resorting instead to appeals to justice to vindicate them. In some 
instances, the awards are made without identifying them as either 
compensatory or restitutionary at all, the court simply content that they 
were available. Thus, in Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet,37 Megaw LJ, 
after referring to authorities supporting such awards, simply concluded:38 
It appears to me to be clear, both as a matter of principle and of 
authority, that in a case of this sort the plaintiff, when he has 
established that the defendant has remained on as a trespasser in 
residential property, is entitled, without bringing evidence that he 
could or would have let the property to someone else in the absence of 
the trespassing defendant, to have as damages for the trespass the 
                                                          
29 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 at 812–814. 
30 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538. 
31 Watson, Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104. 
32 Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 
2 QB 246. 
33 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 at 815. 
34 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367; Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269; Attorney 
General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268. Cf Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd 
[1993] 1 WLR 1361. 
35 [2007] EWCA Civ 286; [2008] 1 WLR 445. 
36 World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Inc [2007] EWCA 
Civ 286; [2008] 1 WLR 445 at [54]. 
37 [1979] 1 WLR 285. 
38 Swordheath Properties Ltd v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285 at 288. 
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value of the property as it would fairly be calculated; and, in the 
absence of anything special in the particular case it would be the 
ordinary letting value of the property that would determine the 
amount of the damages. 
His Lordship does not elaborate upon whether the principle he referred 
to was compensatory or restitutionary. This is especially perplexing as 
the two authorities cited in support appeal to different objectives. 
Whitwham, it will be seen, appears to favour a compensatory view of the 
user principle whereas Penarth Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Pounds39 
(“Penarth”) is generally regarded as one of the early authorities 
supporting a restitutionary perspective. 
8 Where the awards are referred to as compensatory, there is no 
attempt to explain, beyond broad appeals to justice, how such an 
understanding of them can be squared with the obvious absence of 
pecuniary loss on the part of the plaintiffs. Typical of the reasoning to be 
found in the early cases is the following pithy exercise by Lindley LJ in 
Whitwham:40 
It is unjust to leave out of sight the use which the defendants have 
made of this land for their own purposes, and that lies at the bottom of 
what are called the way-leave cases. Those cases are based upon the 
principle that, if one person has without leave of another been using 
that other’s land for his own purposes, he ought to pay for such user. 
Later in the same judgment, he asks, rhetorically: “[O]n what principle 
of justice can it be said that these defendants are to use the plaintiffs’ 
land for years for their own purposes, and to pay nothing for it, in 
addition to the injury that they have done to the land?”41 Lindley LJ uses 
the word “compensation” thrice in his judgment.42 Lopes LJ refers to the 
plaintiffs being “compensated” in addition using the word “loss” twice to 
describe the effect of the defendants’ trespass on the plaintiffs.43 Rigby LJ 
refers to the principle as a means of “compensating” plaintiffs.44 Yet the 
sum actually awarded far exceeded the diminution in value to the 
plaintiffs’ land attributable to the defendants’ trespass. Furthermore, in 
referring to the controversial authority of Phillips v Homfray,45 
Lindley LJ observed that, in applying the principle, “[i]t must be borne 
                                                          
39 [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 359. 
40 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 541–542. 
41 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 542. 
42 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 541–542. 
43 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 543. 
44 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 543. 
45 (1871) LR 6 Ch 770. 
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in mind that if one man runs trucks on rails over another man’s land it 
does not do any harm whatever, and there is no pecuniary damage”.46 
9 Mention should also be given to two famous and oft-cited 
hypothetical scenarios intended to provoke sympathy in readers for 
such awards. The first is the well-known scenario involving a chair 
posed by the Earl of Halsbury LC in The Mediana:47 
Supposing a person took away a chair out of my room and kept it for 
twelve months, could anybody say you had a right to diminish the 
damages by shewing that I did not usually sit in that chair, or that 
there were plenty of other chairs in the room? The proposition so 
nakedly stated appears to me to be absurd[.] 
The second is the equally celebrated example involving a horse devised 
by Lord Shaw in Watson:48 
If A, being a liveryman, keeps his horse standing idle in the stable, 
and B, against his wish or without his knowledge, rides or drives it out, 
it is no answer to A for B to say: ‘Against what loss do you want to be 
restored? I restore the horse. There is no loss. The horse is none the 
worse; it is the better for the exercise.’ 
10 The traditional justification for the compensatory perspective of 
awards made under the user principle is that, although successful 
plaintiffs have not suffered any actual pecuniary loss, they have in fact 
lost an opportunity to bargain with the defendant.49 Thus, it is suggested 
that they may legitimately be regarded as compensatory. In the words of 
Megarry V-C in Tito v Waddell (No 2):50 
[T]he plaintiff has suffered a loss in that the defendant has taken 
without paying for it something for which the plaintiff could have 
required payment, namely, the right to do the act. The court therefore 
makes the defendant pay what he ought to have paid the plaintiff, for 
that is what the plaintiff has lost. 
11 However, this view of awards made under the user principle has 
been dismissed by a number of scholars as fictional.51 First, awards 
                                                          
46 Whitwham v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co [1896] 2 Ch 538 at 542. 
47 [1900] AC 113 at 117. 
48 Watson, Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 
at 119. 
49 Robert J Sharpe & Stephen M Waddams, “Damages for Lost Opportunity to 
Bargain” (1982) 2 OxJLS 290. See also Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106 at 335; 
Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269; and Gafford v Graham (1998) 76 P & CR 18. 
50 [1977] Ch 106 at 335. 
51 Peter Birks, “Profits of Breach of Contract” (1993) 109 LQR 518; William 
Goodhart, “Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: The Remedy that Dare 
Not Speak Its Name” [2001] RLR 104; James Edelman, “The Compensation Strait-
(cont’d on the next page) 
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made on this basis are assessed on the basis of an assumption that the 
plaintiff is reasonably willing to negotiate. Addressing the related 
principle of Wrotham Park damages, Millett LJ in Jaggard v Sawyer52 
remarked that:53 
In situations of this kind a plaintiff should not be treated as eager to 
sell, which he very probably is not. But the court will not value the 
right at the ransom price which a very reluctant plaintiff might put 
on it. 
Sometimes, as was the case in Wrotham Park itself,54 this assumption 
will be demonstrably false. In that case, Brightman J found that the 
plaintiffs would not have been willing to negotiate at all. In such 
circumstances, the award would undervalue the plaintiffs’ loss. Secondly, 
and conversely, an award under the user principle may also end up 
overcompensating some plaintiffs. In the unusual case of Inverugie 
Investments Ltd v Hackett55 (“Inverugie Investments”), the plaintiff sought 
mesne profits from the defendants for their wrongful occupation and 
use of 30 apartments within a larger hotel complex over a period of 
15 years. The defendants, the hotel operators, unfortunately operated 
the hotel at a loss. Despite the fact that occupancy rates for the hotel 
were so low that the plaintiff had seemingly lost no opportunity to lease 
the apartments occupied by the defendants, the plaintiff ’s award was not 
reduced to reflect the low occupancy rates over that period. 
12 As the law of restitution for unjust enrichment slowly came to 
be judicially recognised by the courts,56 this lack of perfect compatibility 
between remedy and objective led to increasing calls for a reconsideration 
of the underlying objectives of the user principle as restitutionary rather 
than compensatory. One of the early proponents of a reimagination of 
damages under the user principle as restitutionary rather than 
compensatory was Lord Denning. In Strand Electric, the defendant 
retained the plaintiff ’s switchboards in order to facilitate the sale of a 
theatre. In awarding the plaintiff the full market hire rate for the 
switchboards in an action for detinue, Denning LJ remarked:57 
                                                                                                                               
jacket and the Lost Opportunity to Bargain Fiction” [2001] RLR 104; James 
Edelman, Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property 
(Hart Publishing, 2002) at pp 99–102; Graham Virgo, Principles of the Law of 
Restitution (Oxford University Press, 2nd Ed, 2006) at pp 439–440; Andrew Burrows, 
The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) at pp 635–638. 
52 [1995] 1 WLR 269. 
53 Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 282–283. 
54 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 at 815. 
55 [1995] 1 WLR 713. 
56 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548. See also Peter Birks, “The English 
Recognition of Unjust Enrichment” [1991] LMCLQ 473. 
57 Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford Entertainments Ltd [1952] 
2 QB 246 at 254–255. 
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The claim for a hiring charge is therefore not based on the loss to the 
plaintiff, but on the fact that the defendant has used the goods for his 
own purposes. It is an action against him because he has had the 
benefit of the goods. It resembles, therefore, an action for restitution 
rather than an action of tort. 
13 Subsequently, in Penarth, the plaintiffs sued the defendant in 
trespass for ignoring numerous demands to remove his floating 
pontoon from the plaintiffs’ dock. Lord Denning MR awarded 
substantial damages despite acknowledging that the plaintiffs had not 
suffered any loss. According to his Lordship, “the measure of damages is 
not what the plaintiffs have lost but what benefit the defendant obtained 
by having the use of the berth”.58 One of the leading cases supporting a 
restitutionary analysis is Ministry of Defence v Ashman59 (“Ashman”). 
The Ashmans had been living in a house leased from the Ministry of 
Defence. They received a substantial discount owing to Mr Ashman’s 
position as a flight sergeant in the Royal Air Force. However, one of the 
conditions of the lease was that the lease would be forfeited if they 
separated and ceased to live together. After they separated, Mrs Ashman 
received a notice to vacate the house. When she failed to do so, the 
Ministry of Defence sought damages in the form of mesne profits 
against her for the period after the expiry of the lease. The dispute 
concerned the appropriate rate at which the mesne profits should be 
calculated. Allowing the appeal from the trial judge’s award at the full 
market rate for the property, the Court of Appeal reduced the award to 
the cost of local authority housing instead. According to Hoffmann LJ, 
“it has not been expressly stated that a claim for mesne profit for 
trespass can be a claim in restitution. Nowadays I do not see why we 
should not call a spade a spade”.60 The reduction in the award was 
justified on the basis of the application of subjective devaluation. In 
Singapore, the High Court in Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik 
Rajiv61 (“Cavenagh Investment”) likewise recently classified an award for 
mesne profits as restitutionary. According to the court, there is no 
reason:62 
… why we ought not to recognise that where a distinction can be 
made between a compensation-based claim and a restitution-based 
claim, a claim for mesne profit, market rent, under the ‘user principle’, 
or however one may choose to call the claim, is a claim for a 
restitutionary remedy. 
                                                          
58 Penarth Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Pounds [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 359 at 362. 
59 [1993] 2 EGLR 102. 
60 Ministry of Defence v Ashman [1993] 2 EGLR 102 at 106. 
61 [2013] 2 SLR 543. 
62 Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [50]. 
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14 In Attorney General v Blake,63 Lord Nicholls, in describing the 
awards made in cases applying the user principle, stated that:64 
[T]hese awards cannot be regarded as conforming to the strictly 
compensatory measure of damage for the injured person’s loss unless 
loss is given a strained and artificial meaning. The reality is that the 
injured person’s rights were invaded but, in financial terms, he 
suffered no loss. Nevertheless the common law has found a means to 
award him a sensibly calculated amount of money. Such awards are 
probably best regarded as an exception to the general rule [that 
damages are compensatory]. 
Whilst his Lordship did not indicate explicitly that he considered such 
awards restitutionary, he subsequently clarified himself in Kuwait 
Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co:65 
I have just noted that the fundamental object of an award of damages 
for conversion is to award just compensation for loss suffered. 
Sometimes, when the goods or their equivalent are returned, the 
owner suffers no financial loss. But the wrongdoer may well have 
benefited from his temporary use of the owner’s goods. It would not 
be right that he should be able to keep this benefit. The court may 
order him to pay damages assessed by reference to the value of the 
benefit he derived from his wrongdoing. I considered this principle in 
Attorney General v Blake. … In an appropriate case the court may 
award damages on this ‘user principle’ in addition to compensation for 
loss suffered. For instance, if the goods are returned damaged, the 
court may award damages assessed by reference to the benefit 
obtained by the wrongdoer as well as the cost of repair. 
15 Similar developments can also be detected in the related award 
of Wrotham Park damages. While Brightman J employed the language of 
compensation in Wrotham Park itself, in Surrey County Council v 
Bredero Homes Ltd66 (“Surrey County”), Steyn LJ explains that:67 
… [t]here is … a third principle which protects the aggrieved party’s 
restitutionary interest. The object of such an award is not to 
compensate the plaintiff for a loss, but to deprive the defendant of the 
benefit he gained by the breach of contract. 
His Lordship then suggests that Wrotham Park “is only defensible on 
the basis of the third or restitutionary principle”.68 Perhaps even more 
                                                          
63 [2001] 1 AC 268. 
64 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 at 279. 
65 [2002] 2 AC 883 at [87]. 
66 [1993] 1 WLR 1361. 
67 Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 at 1369. 
68 Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 at 1369. 
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forcefully, Lord Nicholls in Attorney General v Blake describes Wrotham 
Park thus:69 
The Wrotham Park case, therefore, still shines, rather as a solitary 
beacon, showing that in contract as well as tort damages are not always 
narrowly confined to recoupment of financial loss. In a suitable case 
damages for breach of contract may be measured by the benefit gained 
by the wrongdoer from the breach. The defendant must make a 
reasonable payment in respect of the benefit he has gained. 
16 However, the march towards a restitutionary justification of 
awards under the user principle is not altogether relentless. Pockets of 
resistance to the restitutionary analysis remain. Denning LJ was clearly 
in the minority in Strand Electric. Shortly after Surrey County was 
decided, the English Court of Appeal decided the case of Jaggard v 
Sawyer. Sir Thomas Bingham MR, giving the leading judgment, stated 
bluntly: “I cannot, however, accept that Brightman J’s assessment of 
damages in Wrotham Park was based on other than compensatory 
principles.”70 Likewise Millett LJ, who delivered a separate judgment, 
remarked that “[i]t is plain from his judgment in the Wrotham Park case 
that Brightman J’s approach was compensatory, not restitutionary”.71 
More recently, in World Wide Fund, a forceful Chadwick LJ asserted that 
such awards (and rather more controversially, awards for an account of 
profit) were compensatory in nature:72 
When the court makes an award of damages on the Wrotham Park 
basis it does so because it is satisfied that that is a just response to 
circumstances in which the compensation which is the claimant’s due 
cannot be measured (or cannot be measured solely) by reference to 
identifiable financial loss. Lord Nicholls’s analysis in Blake’s case 
demonstrates that there are exceptional cases in which the just 
response to circumstances in which the compensation which is the 
claimant’s due cannot be measured by reference to identifiable 
financial loss is an order which deprives the wrongdoer of all the fruits 
of his wrong. The circumstances in which an award of damages on the 
Wrotham Park basis may be an appropriate response, and those in 
which the appropriate response is an account of profits, may differ in 
degree. But the underlying feature, in both cases, is that the court 
recognises the need to compensate the claimant in circumstances 
where he cannot demonstrate identifiable financial loss. To label an 
award of damages on the Wrotham Park basis as a ‘compensatory’ 
remedy and an order for an account of profits as a ‘gains-based’ 
remedy does not assist an understanding of the principles on which 
the court acts. The two remedies should, I think, each be seen as a 
                                                          
69 Attorney General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 at 283–284. 
70 Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 281. 
71 Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 at 291. 
72 World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Inc [2007] EWCA 
Civ 286; [2008] 1 WLR 445 at [59]. 
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flexible response to the need to compensate the claimant for the wrong 
which has been done to him. 
17 Criticism of the restitutionary analysis can likewise be seen in 
the academic literature. Stevens criticises the restitutionary analysis as 
equally flawed compared to the compensatory analysis: “Just as an 
expanded notion of loss has sometimes been used to explain [such 
awards], an expansion notion of gain has been suggested.”73 Thus he 
observed that while the majority’s reasoning in Strand Electric has 
rightly been criticised as fictional, Denning LJ’s restitutionary analysis is 
equally faulty:74 
The defendant did not profit from the detention [of the plaintiff ’s 
equipment], as it had no use for the equipment. … the overall result of 
the defendant’s tort was not to leave it factually better off. If the wrong 
had not been committed, no substitute equipment would have been 
hired. As with losses, if the claim is genuinely based upon the 
defendant’s gain, his overall position as a result of the wrong ought 
to be taken into account. Without any factual gain made, the 
restitutionary analysis is equally artificial. 
18 Stevens acknowledges that “it may be objected that a broader 
notion of ‘gain’ is required and that the gain is not factual but 
normative”.75 However, if a restitutionary analysis resorts to a normative 
notion of gain, how is it superior to the compensatory analysis? As 
McInnes observed, “[i]f it is fictional to regard an objectively reasonable 
price as the claimant’s loss, it must equally be fictional to treat it as 
the defendant’s gain. Loss and gain reflect two sides of the same 
hypothetical bargain”.76 
19 The key to resolving the dispute lies therefore in determining 
the proper scope of loss and gain in the law. As Mance LJ explained in 
Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc:77 
Whether the adoption of a standard measure of damages represents a 
departure from a compensatory approach depends upon what one 
understands by compensation and whether the term is only apt in 
circumstances where an injured party’s financial position, viewed 
subjectively, is being precisely restored. The law frequently introduces 
objective measures (eg the available market rules in sale of goods) or 
limitations (eg remoteness). The former may increase or limit a 
claimant’s ability to recover loss actually suffered. Another situation 
where damages do not necessarily depend upon precisely what would 
                                                          
73 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 79. 
74 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 79. 
75 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p 79. 
76 Mitchell McInnes, “Gain, Loss and the User Principle” [2006] RLR 76 at 83. 
77 [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830 at [26], per Mance LJ. 
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have occurred but for the wrong is where there has been a conversion: 
cf Kuwait Airways Corpn v Iraqi Airways Co. 
V. The importance of being restitutionary? 
20 It can be seen that whether we are satisfied with either the 
compensatory or restitutionary analyses or neither depends very much 
upon our notions of compensation and restitution as well as the related 
concepts of loss and gain. A focus on purely pecuniary loss deprives the 
compensatory analysis of much of its explanatory force in certain 
scenarios. The same is true of the restitutionary analysis if gain is 
measured purely in pecuniary terms. Depending therefore on one’s 
perspective of loss or gain and depending on the particular facts, one or 
the other analysis may appear to be a better fit, both analyses may be 
equally satisfactory or both analyses may prove equally flawed. This 
Rashomon effect seems inevitable partly because of “the pervasiveness 
of ambiguity in natural languages”78 and partly because the cases 
demonstrate a myriad range of different fact patterns. In some cases, it 
may be that the defendant’s use of the plaintiff ’s property was not 
profitable and it is found as a fact that the plaintiff would likely have 
profitably made use of it himself but for the defendant’s interference. In 
such a case, adopting a narrow purely pecuniary view of gain and loss 
would favour a compensatory analysis. Conversely, the defendant’s use 
of the plaintiff ’s property may have been extremely lucrative in 
circumstances when the plaintiff is found to have been unlikely to have 
made use of the property himself. Here, again assuming a strict 
pecuniary view of gain and loss, a restitutionary analysis would prove 
more persuasive. 
21 If a broader view of gain and loss is adopted, then most cases 
engaging the user principle could be equally justified by either analysis. 
Thus, we also see cases justifying such awards on a mixed or even 
alternative basis. An example of the former is Inverugie Investments, in 
which Lord Lloyd suggests that “[t]he principle need not be characterised 
as exclusively compensatory, or exclusively restitutionary; it combines 
elements of both”.79 A variant of the mixed rationale explanation is the 
suggestion by the Singapore Court of Appeal in ACES System 
Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily80 that “there are, in point of fact, 
                                                          
78 Thomas Wasow, Amy Perfors & David Beaver, “The Puzzle of Ambiguity” in 
Morphology and the Web of Grammar: Essays in Memory of Steven G Lapointe 
(C Orhan Orgun & Peter Sells eds) (University of Chicago Press, 2005) at p 265. 
79 Inverugie Investments Ltd v Hackett [1995] 1 WLR 713 at 718. See also Yenty 
Lily v ACES System Development Pte Ltd [2013] 1 SLR 577 at [67]–[68], 
per Judith Prakash J. 
80 [2013] 4 SLR 1317. 
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two distinct principles (viz, the compensation principle and the user 
principle) – as opposed to two different rationales with respect to the 
same principle (here, the user principle)” [emphasis in original].81 This 
view, it is said, “allows (and attractively so) the user principle to be 
regarded as a wholly separate principle or approach premised on a 
restitutionary basis” [emphasis in original].82 On this view, some cases 
previously regarded as being premised upon the user principle would 
presumably have to be recharacterised as orthodox cases of 
compensation not engaging the user principle. Others, properly 
regarded as involving the user principle, would be regarded as being 
justified on a purely restitutionary basis. Yet others, such as Strand 
Electric, can be analysed either way. Thus, according to Andrew Phang 
Boon Leong JA, it might be preferable:83 
… to acknowledge that Somervell LJ and Romer LJ were in fact 
referring to the compensation principle when arriving at their 
respective decisions. If so, then only Denning LJ was utilising the user 
principle in arriving at his decision. 
One of the key problems with such an alternative analysis is that it 
appears to adopt a broader conception of loss84 than that employed by 
critics of the compensatory analysis of the user principle, who employ a 
narrow pecuniary view of loss. If such a broader conception of loss is 
permissible, it is difficult to contemplate a case in which it is either 
necessary or preferable to rely on a restitutionary analysis. This is 
because, to the extent that differences exist in terms of calculation of an 
award under the user principle depending on one’s analysis, no 
advantage seems to accrue to a plaintiff employing a restitutionary 
analysis.85 
A. Theoretical differences: Practical significance or much ado 
about nothing? 
22 What then are the consequences of adopting either analysis 
(or the view that both analyses are available)? Will there be substantial 
differences in the calculation of the award or is it a case of much ado 
                                                          
81 ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [38], 
per Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA. 
82 ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [41], 
per Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA. 
83 ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] 4 SLR 1317 at [39], 
per Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA. 
84 It is important to note that in Strand Electric and Engineering Co Ltd v Brisford 
Entertainments Ltd [1952] 2 QB 246, Somervell LJ considered that substantial 
damages were available even if the plaintiffs “had suffered no loss” (at 250) and 
Romer LJ ruled out contrary proof of loss altogether (at 256–257). 
85 See paras 22–25 below. 
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about nothing? The authorities as they stand suggest that there may be 
at least two important differences that flow from a restitutionary rather 
than a compensatory analysis. The first is the availability to the 
defendant of what has been called subjective devaluation.86 In cases of 
unjust enrichment, a defendant is able to subjectively devalue a benefit 
conferred upon him. The necessity of such a principle in cases of unjust 
enrichment was neatly encapsulated by Pollock CB in Taylor v Laird87 
when he observed: “One cleans another’s shoes. What can the other do 
but put them on?”88 Its availability in cases of restitution for wrongs 
(torts) rather than unjust enrichment, however, is rather less obvious. In 
Ashman, the award of mesne profits against the defendant was not 
assessed at the market value of the property that was the subject of 
the trespassory occupation as it ordinarily would be, even on a 
restitutionary analysis of the user principle. Instead it was measured by 
the cost of local authority housing that the defendant would have gone 
into had any been available. A similar result was reached in Ministry of 
Defence v Thompson89 (“Thompson”) which featured similar facts. It is 
generally accepted that the principle of subjective devaluation is 
generally irrelevant where restitution is sought as a remedy for a tort 
claim.90 This is because, unlike defendants in claims for unjust 
enrichment, tortfeasors’ actions are not involuntary, even in cases 
involving strict liability torts such as trespass. Both Ashman and 
Thompson have been justified on the basis of their exceptional facts.91 In 
both cases, the trespass involved a tenant who was previously lawfully in 
occupation wrongfully staying on after the lease had terminated. In both 
instances, the originally lawful occupation was heavily subsidised and 
neither defendant would have remained in occupation had alternative 
affordable accommodation been available. While commentators have 
accommodated the two cases on the basis of their exceptional facts 
owing to the defendants’ lack of practical ability to leave the premises, it 
is arguable that they are in fact simply wrongly decided. As Virgo 
astutely observes, in relation to Ashman, “[l]ogically, if the defendant 
had been looking for free accommodation with a friend she could not be 
                                                          
86 Note the divergence in approaches, in the context of a claim in unjust enrichment, 
between Lord Clarke and the majority and Lord Reed in Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] 
UKSC 50; [2014] AC 938. 
87 (1956) 25 LJ Ex 329. 
88 Taylor v Laird (1956) 25 LJ Ex 329 at 332. 
89 [1993] 2 EGLR 107. 
90 James Edelman, Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual 
Property (Hart Publishing, 2002) at p 71; Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) at pp 626–627. 
91 James Edelman, Gain-based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual 
Property (Hart Publishing, 2002) at p 71; Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) at pp 626–627. 
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considered to have received any valuable benefit at all”.92 Such a 
conclusion is instinctively unappealing. Virgo defends the cases on the 
basis that:93 
… [s]uch recognition of restitutionary damages will not cause any 
injustice to the claimant, because, if his or her loss is greater than the 
defendant’s actual benefit, the claimant can simply elect to claim 
compensatory rather than restitutionary damages. 
It will be seen that whether or not an alternative claim for compensatory 
damages will prove to be a panacea will depend in large part of one’s 
definition of gain and loss.94 
23 The second important difference is the possible availability of 
the defence of change of position where the plaintiff seeks a 
restitutionary award. Here again the availability of the defence is 
controversial. In Cavenagh Investment, yet another case involving a claim 
for mesne profits, the Singapore High Court held that the defence was 
available because the award was restitutionary. The plaintiff, Cavenagh 
Investment Pte Ltd, was part of a group of companies (the Lee Tat 
group) structured to hold property, all of which were either solely or 
majority owned by Ching Mun Fong. The plaintiff ’s only assets were 
two units at the Pebble Bay condominium development and the suit 
concerned one of these units. The properties of the Lee Tat group were 
managed by Lee Tat Property Management Pte Ltd, a company run by 
Ching and several employees, including one Mohamed Razali bin 
Chichik. The defendant, Rajiv Kaushik, responded to an advertisement 
seeking prospective tenants for the disputed property and eventually 
entered into what he believed was a tenancy agreement with the plaintiff 
through Razali. This arrangement lasted from December 2008 through 
March 2011, during which monthly rent of S$9,000 and two months’ 
security deposit was paid by the defendant’s employer, I2MS.Net Pte Ltd 
(“I2MS.Net”), to Razali. The lease, it transpired, was unauthorised and 
Razali had not handed over the sums paid by I2MS.Net to the plaintiff. 
The fraud was discovered in March 2011 and the plaintiff sued the 
defendant claiming mesne profits for trespass to land. Chan Seng Onn J 
considered that “a claim for mesne profit, market rent, under the ‘user 
principle’, or however one might choose to call the claim, is a claim for a 
restitutionary remedy”.95 His Honour further found both that the 
plaintiff was insistent on a minimum monthly rent of $10,000 for the 
                                                          
92 Graham Virgo, Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 
2nd Ed, 2006) at p 467. Cf Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] UKSC 50; [2014] AC 938 
at [132]–[135], per Lord Reed JSC in the minority. 
93 Graham Virgo, Principles of the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 
2nd Ed, 2006) at p 467. 
94 See para 28 below. 
95 Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [50]. 
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property and that no tenants were willing to pay such a rent throughout 
the period of the defendant’s wrongful occupation. As such, the plaintiff 
suffered no financial loss. The court had occasion to consider the view 
expressed by Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd96 that “it is 
commonly accepted that the defence [of change of position] should not 
be open to a wrongdoer”.97 While some commentators have construed 
this short statement as excluding the operation of the defence in cases of 
restitution for wrongs,98 others suggest that the defence ought to be 
available prima facie to tortfeasors subject to any overriding policy 
considerations.99 The court preferred the latter view and accordingly 
reduced the defendant’s liability by the amount of rent actually paid. The 
difficulty with the case is that the academic commentary cited by the 
court in support of its view may not actually support the final result. 
The court attached significant credence to the views of Bant, which it 
described as “more nuanced”.100 However, Bant suggests that “[e]ach 
wrong must be individually addressed to see whether recognition of a 
change of position defence would undermine the law’s prohibition”.101 
She further posits that:102 
… allowing the change of position defence in cases where the 
claimant’s action is based on their vested proprietary right to the 
benefit (such as claims of conversion, or claims to vindicate a  
pre-existing property right) may be regarded as undermining the law’s 
traditional protection of proprietary rights. 
Although both passages are cited with apparent approval, Chan J 
concludes: “I do not see why the defence should not apply to a 
restitutionary claim for trespass to land.”103 But surely an action for 
trespass to land is a claim to vindicate a pre-existing property right? 
This is not to suggest that the result cannot be justified. Others, most 
notably Lord Nicholls, have suggested that the change of position 
defence should be available to an innocent converter, a tortfeasor in an 
analogous position to a trespasser having likewise interfered with a 
pre-existing property right.104 
                                                          
96 [1991] 2 AC 548. 
97 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548 at 580. 
98 See, eg, Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 
2011) at p 699. 
99 See, eg, Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 171. 
100 Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [63]. 
101 Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 172. 
102 Elise Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 210. 
103 Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] 2 SLR 543 at [65]. 
104 Kuwait Airways Corp v Iraqi Airways Co (Nos 4 and 5) [2002] UKHL 19; [2002] 
2 AC 883 at [79]. See also Richard Nolan, “Change of Position” in Laundering and 
Tracing (Peter Birks ed) (Clarendon Press, 1995) at p 154. 
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24 While there is some discussion in Devenish Nutrition Ltd v 
Sanofi-Aventis SA (France)105 (“Devenish”) of what was there described 
as a “passing-on defence”106 in the context of determining if compensatory 
damages were inadequate so that a restitutionary award would be 
available,107 there was no serious consideration of whether such a 
defence was actually applicable to a claim for either a compensatory or a 
restitutionary award. Indeed, the description of the phenomenon as a 
defence in the context of a compensatory award has been criticised. As 
Odudu and Virgo observed:108 
… it is odd to use the language of a defence when the Court was only 
concerned with the identification and assessment of an appropriate 
remedy rather than with the negation or qualification of the 
underlying cause of action. 
While this criticism may possibly be dismissed as semantic nitpicking, 
Odudu and Virgo rightly note that “whether the fact of passing-on really 
can negate loss suffered is a matter of some difficulty, which was ignored 
by the Court”.109 The case concerned a breach by the defendant of 
European competition law through collusion with other vitamin 
suppliers to increase their prices. While the plaintiff had passed on its 
loss to its own purchasers, it is arguable that “the effect of the cartel 
agreements was to squeeze its margin so that it did suffer a loss, despite 
the fact that the increase in prices had been passed on to customers”.110 
The controversy is eerily familiar to the difficulties arising out of the 
market rule of damages assessment in the context of sales of goods 
where defective goods have been sold pursuant to a sub-sale. The 
leading authorities111 are in disarray, probably irreconcilable and likely 
reflect a fundamental disagreement as to whether loss should be 
regarded narrowly in purely pecuniary terms or broadly on a normative 
basis. Given the diffidence of the discussion, its rather oblique context, 
and the possibility that passing-on could apply equally to a claim for a 
restitutionary award, it is not obvious that Devenish introduced a 
third practical significance to a proper understanding of the user 
principle as either restitutionary or compensatory. 
                                                          
105 [2008] EWCA Civ 1086; [2009] 3 WLR 198. 
106 Devenish Nutrition Ltd v Sanofi-Aventis SA (France) [2008] EWCA Civ 1086; 
[2009] 3 WLR 198 at [108], per Arden LJ. 
107 A requirement thought to be introduced by Lord Nicholls in Attorney-General v 
Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 at 285. 
108 Okeoghene Odudu & Graham Virgo, “Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages” 
[2009] RLR 112 at 113. 
109 Okeoghene Odudu & Graham Virgo, “Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages” 
[2009] RLR 112 at 113–114. 
110 Okeoghene Odudu & Graham Virgo, “Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages” 
[2009] RLR 112 at 114. 
111 See, eg, Slater v Hoyle & Smith [1920] 2 KB 11 and Bence Graphics International 
Ltd v Fasson UK Ltd [1998] QB 87. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 The User Principle:  
(2016) 28 SAcLJ Rashomon Effect or Much Ado about Nothing? 1003 
 
25 It is not generally thought that any difference will follow in 
terms of limitation depending on whether the award is regarded as 
compensatory or restitutionary.112 
B. Gains and losses through the looking glass 
26 It is not sufficient, however, to consider the availability of 
principles and defences in the abstract to determine if practical 
consequences flow from a characterisation of awards made under the 
user principle as compensatory or restitutionary. The availability or 
otherwise of these principles and defences interact with the law’s 
notions of gain and loss to different effect. If we consider that both gain 
and loss can be interpreted either broadly to include normative gains 
and losses or narrowly to be limited to pecuniary gains and losses, it 
follows that there are four theoretically possible permutations that the 
law can adopt. First, both gains and losses can be interpreted broadly. 
Secondly, both gains and losses can be interpreted narrowly. Thirdly, 
gains can be interpreted broadly while losses are interpreted narrowly. 
Finally, and conversely, gains can be interpreted narrowly while losses 
are interpreted broadly. Whilst theoretically possible simply as a matter 
of mathematical permutation, the third and fourth possibilities would 
be difficult to justify given the inconsistent views of gain and loss that 
they entail. Accordingly, only the first and second views will be 
considered. 
27 On the first view, both gains and losses can include normative 
gains and losses. The absence of either actual pecuniary loss to the 
plaintiff or actual financial gain to the defendant thus becomes 
irrelevant to the success of a claim for an award under the user principle. 
So assessed, however, the normative gain on the part of the defendant 
simply reflects the normative loss on the part of the plaintiff so that, at 
least prima facie, there ought to be no difference in quantum whichever 
view is taken. On this view, since all interferences will entail a normative 
loss and quantification will not lead to a larger award on the 
restitutionary basis, it is difficult to see the practical utility of making a 
restitutionary award available to plaintiffs. This is especially true if the 
restitutionary award (but not the compensatory award) is capable of 
being subjectively devalued and/or met with the defence of change of 
position. 
28 If the second view is to be preferred, then the practical 
significance of a proper theoretical understanding of the user principle 
takes on greater import. Depending on the particular facts of any given 
                                                          
112 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) 
at pp 703–704. Cf Chesworth v Farrar [1967] 1 QB 407. 
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case, the defendant’s gain may be greater or lesser than the plaintiff ’s 
loss. This difference may be exacerbated by the availability of the 
principle of subjective devaluation and/or the change of position 
defence. However, on this view, the courts must be prepared to entertain 
the possibility of a nil award in some cases. This seems to be an 
inevitable conclusion and, but for the five days of occupation for which 
the defendant did not pay rent to the plaintiff ’s rogue agent in Cavenagh 
Investment, this would have been the precise result in that case. Clearly, 
Chan J did not consider this to be an issue. However, if we alter the facts 
of the case slightly so that the reason for the reduction in the 
restitutionary award was not the result of the operation of the change of 
position defence but that of the principle of subjective devaluation, it is 
difficult to imagine a court being comfortable with the same result.113 
Suppose the defendant simply stays on following the expiry of a valid 
lease because he has fallen on hard times and is unable to afford 
alternative accommodation. Perhaps, as Virgo suggests, he sought free 
accommodation with friends and family but they all spurned him. 
Instead of being a greedy rogue seeking to enrich himself, let us imagine 
that the plaintiff ’s errant employee had simply sympathised with the 
defendant and decided that, since the apartment would be empty 
anyway, there was no harm in permitting the defendant to continue in 
his occupation. It is difficult to imagine that a court would in such 
circumstances still limit the plaintiff ’s award to one of nominal 
damages. Yet, as Burrows observes, in the context of an analysis of 
Wrotham Park damages, “[j]ust as compensation runs out where the 
claimant has suffered no loss, so restitution runs out whether the 
wrongdoer has made no gain”.114 He cautions against “the instinct that, 
even if compensation and restitution are inappropriate, one still has a 
need for an appropriate remedy to mark the wrongdoing”, conceding 
that “at that point … one should accept that nominal damages alone are 
justified”.115 Judicial instinct is, however, a difficult beast to tame. This 
does not mean that such a view of gain and loss is untenable. It may well 
simply be the case that, if the courts adopt a narrow purely pecuniary 
view of gains and loss, they ought to exclude the operation of the 
principle of subjective devaluation altogether. 
                                                          
113 In this context, the divergence in approaches in Benedetti v Sawiris [2013] 
UKSC 50; [2014] AC 938 will prove significant: the majority analysis applied in the 
context of a tort will produce the discomfort described in the main text whereas 
the defence will not be available on Lord Reed’s analysis. 
114 Andrew Burrows, “Are ‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, 
Restitutionary or Neither?” in Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
at p 180. 
115 Andrew Burrows, “Are ‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, 
Restitutionary or Neither?” in Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
at pp 180–181. 
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VI. An even bigger picture 
29 Thus far, while it has been demonstrated that a restitutionary 
analysis of the user principle could yield differences in result from a 
compensatory analysis, much less has been said of which analysis is 
preferable as a matter of principle. If we confine our analysis to the 
context of the user principle, it is not immediately obvious that one view 
is preferable to the other. Much depends on whether the law’s 
conception of gain and loss ought to be confined to pecuniary gains and 
losses and cases engaging the user principle do not demonstrate in an 
obvious manner which view is preferable. However, stepping away from 
cases involving the user principle allows us to witness similar awards in 
other areas of the law that have either never been analysed in terms of 
restitution or are incapable of being so analysed, thereby supporting the 
compensatory analysis and demonstrating that the law takes a broad 
rather than narrow view of loss. In contract, quite apart from Wrotham 
Park damages, the market rule of assessment of damages is generally 
considered compensatory.116 The award in Ruxley Electronics and 
Construction Ltd v Forsyth117 (“Ruxley”) likewise demonstrates that loss 
is not always measured in purely financial terms. This broader view of 
loss is likewise consistent with the broad ground of recovery proposed 
by Lords Goff and Millett in Alfred McAlpine Construction Ltd v 
Panatown Ltd,118 a view which would be more principled than the 
narrow ground adopted by the majority and which would resolve the 
problem of “legal black holes”. 
30 In the law of tort, it is indisputable that the law compensates for 
losses other than pecuniary losses. Personal injury, psychiatric harm and 
injury to reputation are all compensable regardless of whether they 
result in consequential pecuniary losses. Such awards are incapable of 
being analysed in restitutionary terms but, provided a sufficiently 
broad conception of loss is adopted, can be readily understood as 
compensatory. Lord Scott, writing extra-judicially, provided a particularly 
lucid defence of such a broad understanding of loss. Against the 
backdrop of physical injuries and injuries to reputation, his Lordship 
explained:119 
                                                          
116 Robert Stevens, “Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or 
Not?” in Exploring Contract Law (Jason W Neyers, Richard Bronaugh & 
Stephen G A Pitel eds) (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 171. See also Michael Bridge, 
“The Market Rule of Damages Assessment” in Contract Damages: Domestic 
and International Perspectives (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) 
(Hart Publishing, 2008) at p 431. 
117 [1996] AC 344. 
118 [2001] 1 AC 518. 
119 Rt Hon Lord Scott of Foscote, “Damages” [2007] LMCLQ 465 at 466. 
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The word ‘loss’, however, needs amplification. ‘Loss’ is not to be 
identified in exclusively pecuniary or material terms. Physical injuries 
caused by negligence may cause relatively little, if any, pecuniary loss 
but may involve some physical impairment that constitutes ‘loss’ by 
any normal yardstick. The ‘loss’ must, therefore, be given a monetary 
value that can be reflected in an award of compensatory damages. The 
function of the award is still compensation although the quantum of 
the award may appear arbitrary. Pain and suffering resulting from the 
physical injuries, even if transitory, represents for the period of the 
suffering a loss of the normal blessing of a freedom from those things. 
Damages awarded for the pain and suffering can be recognized as 
compensatory in intent. 
In relation to some torts the nature of the wrongful conduct produces 
damage that is of an intangible character. Defamation, an obvious 
example, involves damage to the reputation. A money value must be 
put on this, and, here again, the valuation of the loss may appear 
arbitrary, but the purpose of the award is, or should be, compensatory. 
It should come as no surprise then that, on such a broad view of loss, his 
Lordship considers awards made under the user principle as well as 
Wrotham Park damages compensatory rather than restitutionary:120 
“So-called ‘restitutionary’ damages, too, are in my opinion, best explained 
as compensatory damages; awarded to compensate for a loss caused by a 
wrong.”121 
31 Such a broad conception of loss is aligned with Lord Shaw’s 
exhortation to judges in Watson to award damages “by the exercise of a 
sound imagination and the practice of the broad axe”.122 Whilst not the 
earliest authority on the user principle, Watson is perhaps one of the 
most cited, in part because of his Lordship’s colourful exhortation to 
judicial creativity, and in part because of his Lordship’s famous example 
of the horse and its unauthorised exercise. However, a fuller citation of 
Lord Shaw’s judgment will also demonstrate that his Lordship’s 
conception of the user principle is both consistent with that of 
Lord Scott’s and a broad view of loss. According to his Lordship:123 
In the case of damages in general, there is one principle which does 
underlie the assessment. It is what may be called that of restoration. 
The idea is to restore the person who has sustained injury and loss to 
the condition in which he would have been had he not so sustained it. 
In the cases of financial loss, injury to trade, and the like, caused either 
by breach of contract or by tort, the loss is capable of correct 
                                                          
120 Rt Hon Lord Scott of Foscote, “Damages” [2007] LMCLQ 465 at 467–468. 
121 Rt Hon Lord Scott of Foscote, “Damages” [2007] LMCLQ 465 at 467. 
122 Watson, Laidlow & Co Ltd v Pott, Casseels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 
at 117–118. 
123 Watson, Laidlow & Co Ltd v Pott, Casseels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 
at 117–118. 
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appreciation in stated figures. In a second class of cases, restoration 
being in point of fact difficult, as in the case of loss of reputation, or 
impossible, as in the case of loss of life, faculty, or limb, the task of 
restoration under the name of compensation calls into play inference, 
conjecture, and the like. This is necessarily accompanied by those 
deficiencies which attach to the conversion into money of certain 
elements which are very real which go to make up the happiness and 
usefulness of life, but which were never so converted or measured. The 
restoration by way of compensation is therefore accomplished to a 
large extent by the exercise of a sound imagination and the practice of 
the broad axe. … In patent cases the principle of restoration is in all 
instances to some extent, and in many instances to the entire extent 
dependent upon the same principle of restoration. 
More specifically, his Lordship says of interferences with property 
rights:124 
[W]herever an abstraction or invasion of property has occurred, then, 
unless such abstraction or invasion were to be sanctioned by law, the 
law ought to yield a recompense under the category or principle … 
either of price or hire. 
32 It is also notable that this broad conception of loss and 
compensation is also compatible with a trustee’s liability to restore trust 
assets where they have been misapplied,125 which again cannot be 
understood in restitutionary terms.126 
33 Such awards are now often described as “substitutive”. 
Sometimes used in conjunction with the neutral word “damages”,127 it is 
also sometimes used in conjunction with the word “compensation”.128 
Their substitutive nature is most obvious in the context of Wrotham 
Park damages. It will be recalled that such awards were originally 
granted in Wrotham Park itself pursuant to the power to award damages 
                                                          
124 Watson, Laidlow & Co Ltd v Pott, Casseels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 
at 119. 
125 Steven Elliott, “Remoteness Criteria in Equity” (2002) 65 MLR 588. Cf Lionel 
Smith, “The Measurement of Compensation Claims against Trustees and 
Fiduciaries” in Exploring Private Law (Elise Bant & Matthew Harding eds) 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010) at p 363. See also in this journal Lusina Ho, 
“An Account of Accounts” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 849 and Yip Man & Goh Yihan, 
“Navigating the Maze: Making Sense of Equitable Compensation and Account of 
Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 884. 
126 Cf Re Dawson [1966] 2 NSWR 211, where restitution was used to mean restoration. 
127 See Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007) and Robert 
Stevens, “Damages and the Right to Performance: A Golden Victory or Not?” in 
Exploring Contract Law (Jason W Neyers, Richard Bronaugh & Stephen 
G A Pitel eds) (Hart Publishing, 2009) at p 171. 
128 See Steven Elliott & Charles Mitchell, “Remedies for Dishonest Assistance” (2004) 
57 MLR 16 at 24. 
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in lieu of specific relief under Lord Cairns’ Act. When used in 
conjunction with the word “compensation”, substitutive compensation is 
to be contrasted with reparative compensation. As Cunnington explains:129 
[E]tymologically, the word ‘compensation’ can carry two different 
meanings: it can mean a monetary equivalent to a right of which a 
person has been deprived or denied …, which might be labelled 
‘substitutive compensation’; or it can mean a monetary recompense for 
loss or damage suffered. This is the much more familiar sense of 
‘reparative compensation’ or ‘compensation for loss’. 
34 Whilst reparative compensation is subjective, “substitutive 
compensation is objective, calculated by reference to the objective value 
of the right of which the claimant has been deprived”.130 Where a market 
exists, as in cases involving the sale of goods, such awards are derived 
from the market value,131 giving the appearance of exactitude in 
quantification as well as a mirage of subjective loss. Where there is no 
available market, for example, in cases involving physical injuries, such 
awards are, as Lord Scott observed, necessarily somewhat arbitrary. 
Cases involving the user principle and the associated Wrotham Park 
damages straddle these two extremes. Thus, the hypothetical negotiation 
process undertaken by the court entails certain assumptions that may be 
utterly false. As Lord Walker observed in Pell Frischmann Engineering 
Ltd v Bow Valley Iran Ltd:132 
It is a negotiation between a willing buyer (the contract-breaker) and a 
willing seller (the party claiming damages) in which the subject-
matter of the negotiation is the release of the relevant contractual 
obligation. Both parties are to be assumed to act reasonably. The fact 
that one or both parties would in practice have refused to make a deal 
is therefore to be ignored … 
This was the case in Wrotham Park itself. 
35 The fiction that this process entails has led to the explosion of 
the myth that the loss in such cases is the loss of an opportunity to 
bargain.133 Some proponents of the substitutive award model eschew the 
                                                          
129 Ralph Cunnington, “The Measure and Availability of Gain-based Damages for 
Breach of Contract” in Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
(Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) at p 215. 
130 Ralph Cunnington, “The Measure and Availability of Gain-based Damages for 
Breach of Contract” in Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
(Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) at p 215. 
131 See, eg, Michael Bridge, “The Market Rule of Damages Assessment” in Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph 
Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) at p 431. 
132 [2009] UKPC 45; [2011] 1 WLR 2370 at [49]. 
133 Robert J Sharpe & Stephen M Waddams, “Damages for Lost Opportunity to 
Bargain” (1982) 2 OxJLS 290. 
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language of loss and compensation altogether but those that do point to 
a different loss than the lost opportunity to bargain. In the context of the 
user principle strictly so-called, McInnes describes the award as 
compensating “for the value of the lost right”,134 departing from the loss 
of the hypothetical bargain theory. That right is “the right of dominium 
(ie the right to control access and use)”.135 While some diehard 
restitutionary scholars object to the use of the word “lost” in this 
context:136 
… [t]his objection is perhaps overstated. Whilst it is true that the 
claimant retains her secondary right to damages, it is very often the 
case that she has lost her primary right to performance of the 
defendant’s obligations. Thus, it is not entirely inappropriate to speak 
about ‘lost rights’.[137] 
A more sophisticated analysis describes the loss as a loss of the power 
to insist on his right by applying to court for ex ante injunctive relief,138 
but it is debatable if the analysis possesses greater explanatory force 
or merely introduces unnecessary complexity. Nor does it “[leave] 
unexplained those cases where a reasonable fee or disgorgement 
damages have been awarded for breach of contract, but no relevant 
proprietary right was infringed”.139 It is understandable for McInnes to 
refer to the right of dominium in his explanation of the user principle as 
the principle strictly so-called applies exclusively to what may be 
regarded as property torts. Once accepted, however, the same rationale 
is easily extended to non-property rights, as can be seen in Stevens’ 
thesis,140 though he avoids the use of the word “loss”. 
VII. From a broad axe to a tangled web 
36 However, the hypothetical bargain, whilst discredited as a 
theory of loss, remains treacherous terrain. Both courts and 
commentators have on occasion become so embroiled in this entirely 
fictional exercise that they end up with principles so contorted as to 
                                                          
134 Mitchell McInnes, “Gain, Loss and the User Principle” [2006] RLR 76 at 85. 
135 Mitchell McInnes, “Gain, Loss and the User Principle” [2006] RLR 76 at 85. 
136 Andrew Burrows, “Are ‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, 
Restitutionary or Neither?” in Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives (Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) 
at p 173. 
137 Ralph Cunnington, “The Measure and Availability of Gain-based Damages for 
Breach of Contract” in Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives 
(Djakhongir Saidov & Ralph Cunnington eds) (Hart Publishing, 2008) at p 216. 
138 Kit Barker, “‘Damages Without Loss’: Can Hohfeld Help?” (2014) 34 OxJLS 631. 
139 Katy Barnett, Accounting for Profit for Breach of Contract: Theory and Practice 
(Hart Publishing, 2012) at p 20. 
140 Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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be practically inexplicable. For example, according to Neuberger LJ in 
Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire Properties Ltd:141 
Given that negotiating damages … are meant to be compensatory, and 
are normally to be assessed or valued at the date of breach, principle 
and consistency indicate that post-valuation events are normally 
irrelevant; but, given the quasi-equitable nature of such damages, the 
judge may, where there are good reasons, direct a departure from the 
norm either by selecting a different valuation date or by directing that 
a specific post-valuation date event be taken into account. 
In short, courts are not to consider events post-breach except when they 
choose to do so. 
37 A shortlist of no less than 13 principles was collated by 
HHJ Hacon recently in the case of Henderson v All Around the World 
Recordings Ltd:142 
(i) The overriding principle is that the damages are 
compensatory: see Attorney-General v Blake at 298 (Lord Hobhouse of 
Woodborough, dissenting but not on this point), Hendrix v PPX 
at [26] (Mance LJ, as he then was) and WWF v World Wrestling at [56] 
(Chadwick LJ). 
(ii) The primary basis for the assessment is to consider what sum 
would have [been] arrived at in negotiations between the parties, had 
each been making reasonable use of their respective bargaining 
positions, bearing in mind the information available to the parties and 
the commercial context at the time that notional negotiation should 
have taken place: see PPX v Hendrix at [45], WWF v World Wrestling 
at [55], Lunn v Liverpool at [25] and Pell v Bow at [48]–[49], [51] 
(Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe). 
(iii) The fact that one or both parties would not in practice have 
agreed to make a deal is irrelevant: see Pell v Bow at [49] 
(iv) As a general rule, the assessment is to be made as at the date 
of the breach: see Lunn Poly at [29] and Pell v Bow at [50]. 
(v) Where there has been nothing like an actual negotiation 
between the parties, it is reasonable for the court to look at the 
eventual outcome and to consider whether or not that is a useful guide 
to what the parties would have thought at the time of their 
hypothetical bargain: see Pell v Bow at [51]. 
                                                          
141 [2006] EWCA Civ 430; [2006] 2 EGLR 29 at [29]. 
142 [2014] EWHC 3087 (IPEC) at [18]–[19]. The first six principles were first 
formulated by Arnold J in Force India Formula One Team Ltd v 1 Malaysia Racing 
Team Sdn Bhd [2012] EWHC 616; [2012] RPC 29. The remaining seven are 
supposed to be derived from Newey J’s decision in 32Red plc v WHG 
(International) Ltd [2013] EWHC 815. 
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(vi) The court can take into account other relevant factors, and in 
particular delay on the part of the claimant in asserting its rights: see 
Pell v Bow at [54] … 
(vii) There are limits to the extent to which the court will have 
regard to the parties’ actual attributes when assessing user principle 
damages. In particular 
(a) the parties’ financial circumstances are not material; 
(b) character traits, such as whether one or other party 
is easygoing or aggressive, are to be disregarded [29]–[31]. 
(viii) In contrast, the court must have regard to the circumstances 
in which the parties were placed at the time of the hypothetical 
negotiation. The task of the court is to establish the value of the 
wrongful use to the defendant, not a hypothetical person. The 
hypothetical negotiation is between the actual parties, assumed to 
bargain with their respective strengths and weaknesses [32]–[33]. 
(ix) If the defendant, at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, 
would have had available a non-infringing course of action, this is a 
matter which the parties can be expected to have taken into account 
[34]–[42]. 
(x) Such an alternative need not have had all the advantages or 
other attributes of the infringing course of action for it to be relevant 
to the hypothetical negotiation [42]. 
(xi) The hypothetical licence relates solely to the right infringed 
[47]–[50]. 
(xii) The hypothetical licence is for the period of the defendant’s 
infringement [51]–[52]. 
(xiii) Matters such as whether the hypothetical licence is exclusive 
or whether it would contain quality control provisions will depend on 
the facts and must accord with the realities of the circumstances under 
which the parties were hypothetically negotiating [56]–[58]. 
No logical explanation is given as to why the court must have regard to 
the circumstances in which the parties were placed at the time of the 
hypothetical negotiation (see (viii)), but that such circumstances do not 
include the parties’ financial circumstances (see (vii)(a)). Principle (iii), 
from which principle (vii)(b) may have been derived, does not reflect 
any principled limitations of the judicial process. Rather, it simply 
reflects the artificiality of the entire hypothetical bargain. It is perhaps 
for this reason that judicial decisions to include or exclude certain 
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factors can prove so controversial.143 When we seek logic in fantasy, we 
are liable to find confusion rather than clarity. 
38 Compared to the comparatively straightforward award for loss 
of amenity in Ruxley, which bears greater resemblance to compensatory 
awards for personal injuries, one wonders if the courts have lost sight of 
the forest for the trees. The broad axe recommended by Lord Shaw 
appears to be on its way to being encrusted by a host of principles 
designed to constrain the judge, often in ways neither self-evident nor 
internally consistent. Perhaps it is time to cast off the hypothetical 
bargain altogether, both as a theory of the loss underlying cases 
engaging the user principle and as the only means of assessing damages 
in such cases. As a theory of loss, it has confused an entire generation of 
legal scholars. As a basis of computing loss, broadly conceived, it risks 
overcomplicating a fictional process with unnecessary details, both real 
and imaginary. The courts must be careful not to let a tool devised by 
them end up constraining them. 
VIII. Conclusion 
39 Damages awarded on the basis of the user principle have been 
the subject of bitter dispute for some decades now, a debate borne 
almost entirely by an excessively narrow conception of loss as pecuniary 
loss. This dispute is not academic, or at least not academic in its 
pejorative sense. A restitutionary understanding of such awards may, in 
certain cases, yield practical differences in result from a compensatory 
analysis. The debate over its underlying basis should therefore be 
regarded as yielding dramatic results rather than be viewed as 
Shakespearean comedy. The key to understanding the debate is that of 
perspective. In law, unlike in film, however, multiple perspectives do not 
tell a more engaging story. It tends to lead to confusion. It is thus 
imperative for us to determine which perspective is correct. This is not 
obvious if we confine ourselves to cases engaging the user principle. 
Both the compensatory and the restitutionary perspectives prove 
plausible on such examination. To better appreciate the appeal of each 
theory, it is helpful to step outside the category of cases that engage the 
user principle strictly. The key, it turns out, is a proper understanding of 
the concept of loss in the common law. Once the similarities between 
such awards and other awards in contract, tort and trust are appreciated, 
the allure of the compensatory perspective is irresistible, provided we 
are prepared to accept that compensation in the law wears two faces, 
substantive and reparative. The attraction of the restitutionary 
                                                          
143 See, eg, some of the criticisms of recent cases in David Llewelyn, “Assessment of 
Damages in Intellectual Property Cases: Some Recent Examples of ‘the Exercise of 
a Sound Imagination and the Practice of a Broad Axe’?” (2015) 27 SAcLJ 480. 
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perspective has always rested in large part on an unsustainably narrow 
conception of loss. Although a restitutionary analysis remains plausible 
even on such a wider view of loss, it is simply unnecessary since a 
restitutionary award, where available, can never, as the law currently 
stands, yield a larger sum than a compensatory award. It is of course 
true that defendants would be keen on a restitutionary analysis since 
awards may be smaller on such an enquiry. However, since the decision 
as to which claim to pursue lies with the plaintiff and not the defendant, 
it is doubtful that any plaintiff would choose to exclusively pursue a 
restitutionary award,144 especially since the common law typically allows 
a plaintiff to pursue alternative claims. Such a wider perspective also 
reminds us that not only is the hypothetical bargain unsuitable as a 
theory of loss, given its fictional nature, but we also ought not to get 
bogged down by introducing too much complexity to its operation. The 
user principle was intended to be a broad axe to be wielded in aid of a 
sound imagination, not a tangled web to constrain the remedial process. 
 
                                                          
144 Cf Ministry of Defence v Ashman [1993] 2 EGLR 102. 
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